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Abstract
Online retailers are using advances in data collection and computing technologies to “personalize” prices, i.e., offer goods
for sale to shoppers at their reservation prices, or the highest price they are willing to pay. In this paper, I offer a criticism
of this practice. I begin by putting online personalized pricing in context. It is not something entirely new, but rather a kind
of price discrimination, a familiar pricing practice. I then offer a fairness-based argument against it. When an online retailer
personalizes prices, it competes unfairly for the social surplus created by a transaction. I defend this argument against objections, and offer a simple remedy: online retailers should either disclose that they are personalizing prices, or stop doing so.
Keywords Competition · Dynamic pricing · Fairness · Personalized pricing · Price discrimination
New technology allows firms to estimate shoppers’ reservation prices, i.e., the highest price that they are willing
to pay (Ezrachi & Stucke, 2016; Mohammed, 2017; Rest
et al., 2020; Wallheimer, 2018). Increasingly, online retailers are using this technology to “personalize” prices, i.e.,
offer goods for sale to shoppers at their reservation prices
(Hannak et al., 2014; Mikians et al., 2012; Seele et al., 2019;
Valentino-Devries et al., 2012). In this paper, I offer a criticism of this practice.
I begin by putting online personalized pricing in context.
It is not something entirely new, but rather a kind of price
discrimination, a familiar pricing practice. Understanding
this may blunt the strong negative reaction most consumers
have to online price personalization (Priester et al., 2020;
Seele et al., 2019; Turow et al., 2005). But it should not,
I argue, lead us to think that there is nothing wrong with
it. I next advance a fairness-based argument against online
price personalization. When an online retailer personalizes
prices, it competes unfairly for the social surplus created
by a transaction. I defend this argument against objections,
distinguish it from rival fairness-based arguments, and offer
a simple remedy: online retailers should either disclose that
they are personalizing prices, or stop doing so.
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Understanding online personalized pricing
The concept of a reservation price is central to the analysis
of personalized pricing. A reservation price is a limit. The
buyer’s reservation price is the highest amount that he is
willing to pay for a good. The seller’s reservation price is the
lowest amount that he is willing to accept for the good. Suppose that I am selling a bike, and I won’t sell it for less than
$200. You want to buy my bike, and you won’t pay more
than $250. $200 is my reservation price and $250 is yours.
The overlap between your reservation price and mine—in
this case $50—is the social surplus.
Personalized pricing can be understood as an attempt by
the seller to capture the entire social surplus in a transaction.
In the case at hand, I engage in personalized pricing when
I attempt to discern your reservation price for the bike, and
offer it for sale to you at that price. Your reservation price is
$250, so I offer you the bike for sale at $250. If your reservation price were lower, say $225, I would offer you the bike
for sale at that price. Retailers who personalize prices may
offer the same good for sale to different people at different
prices at the same time. Suppose you and your friend are
both shopping for a bike. Your reservation price is $250 and
your friend’s is $225. I would be personalizing my prices if
I offer the bike to you for $250 and to your friend for $225.
How do online retailers figure out shoppers’ reservation
prices? Retailers are reluctant to divulge how they personalize prices, or even that they do. But based on what is known
about this practice, it begins with tracking individuals on
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the internet (Mohammed, 2017; Wallheimer, 2018). Sellers
collect information about shoppers’ browsing history, the
type of device they are using to access the website, their zip
code, their social media activity, how often they have visited
the site, where they hover their clicker on the page, how
long their browsing window stays open, and more. They supplement the information they collect with information they
purchase from data brokers (Hannak et al., 2014; Krishnamurthy et al., 2007; Steinberg, 2019). They feed this information into an algorithm that estimates how much shoppers are willing to pay for a good. Of course, the algorithm
doesn’t predict exactly how much shoppers are willing to
pay. But it is able to predict who is willing to pay more and
who is willing to pay less. The seller then displays a higher
price to those who are willing to pay more and a lower price
to those who are willing to pay less.1

Online personalized pricing in context
Consumers tend to be outraged by online price personalization (Priester et al., 2020; Seele et al., 2019). When Amazon
was found to have personalized the prices of DVDs in 2000,
shoppers complained bitterly (Krugman, 2000; Turow et al.,
2005). Amazon apologized and promised it wouldn’t happen
again. Ultimately, I will argue that online price personalization is objectionable. I want to begin, however, by taking
some of the air out of this reaction. I do so by putting online
personalized pricing in context, showing how it is a version
of a common pricing practice. This will help us to see which
arguments against it are likely to have the most traction.

A kind of price discrimination
Online price personalization is in one sense a new phenomenon, made possible by the rise of internet shopping and

1
Marcoux (2006) suggests that personalized pricing is ephemeral in
competitive markets. If one firm F1 tries to sell a good to a shopper
at his reservation price, and this price is above the market clearing
price, another firm F
 2 will offer to sell the good to him at a slightly
lower price. F1 will then lower its price; F
 2 will make a counteroffer; and so on until the market clearing price is reached. This is true
in perfectly competitive markets, but markets in the real world are
imperfect in ways that make personalized pricing possible. Most
importantly, there are information asymmetries in real markets. In our
example, for F2 to offer the shopper a better price, F2 needs to know
what F1 is charging. For F
 1 to make a counteroffer, it needs to know
what F2 offered. But sellers will often be ignorant of what their competitors are charging. This is especially so online, where the prices
being charged are known only to the sellers and buyers. In fact, we
don’t need to infer based on market imperfections that it will be possible for firms to engage in personalized pricing. We know that it is
possible for firms to engage in price discrimination because firms
actually do so (Hannak et al., 2014; Mikians et al., 2012).
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advances in data collection and computing technologies. But
it is in another sense a familiar practice. It is a kind of price
discrimination, a phenomenon with which all shoppers are
familiar, and which is a standard part of a basic economics
education.
A firm engages in price discrimination when it charges
different prices to different people for goods, and the differences in price are not reflected in the goods’ cost of production (Krugman & Wells, 2009; Lipsey & Chrystal, 2007).
Firms discriminate on the basis of consumers’ willingness
to pay, charging more to those who can pay more, and less
to those who can pay less.
According to a standard categorization, there are three
types or degrees of price discrimination. One of these is
personalized pricing, also known as first-degree or perfect
price discrimination. This is discrimination at the individual
level. The prices buyers are charged are based on their individual willingness to pay. Discrimination at the group level
is third-degree price discrimination. This is when buyers are
charged different prices based on their membership in a certain demographic group. Common examples are discounts
for seniors and students. Second-degree price discrimination
is an amorphous category that includes any instance of price
discrimination that cannot be classified as first- or thirddegree. Quantity discounts, rebates, and versioning are often
cited as examples of second-degree price discrimination.2
Second- and third-degree price discrimination are more
common than first-degree price discrimination. This is
because first-degree price discrimination (i.e., personalized
pricing) was, until recently, technically unfeasible on a large
scale. Yet the prices of some goods are still personalized.
The prices of cars, houses, jewelry, mortgages, mattresses,
furniture, labor, and other goods are often negotiated by
buyers and sellers. In fact, the prices of most goods were
the subject of negotiation until recently. Uniform pricing—
putting price tags on goods—was not common until about
150 years ago (Wallheimer, 2018). Negotiation always
involves some amount of personalization. Sellers try to sell
goods to buyers at high prices, and buyers try to bargain
them down. When prices are negotiated, different buyers
will pay different prices. Naturally, the prices people pay
will be partly a function of their reservation prices. Skilled
salespeople will get buyers who are willing to pay more to
pay more, while those who are willing to pay less will pay
less.

2

In versioning, sellers charge more for different versions of the same
product, but the differences in prices do not fully reflect differences in
the price of production. The price difference between hardback and
paperback books is a standard example. Hardback versions of books,
which are typically released prior to the paperback versions, have significantly higher prices than paperback versions, but do not cost significantly more to produce.

Why online personalized pricing is unfair	

The moral status of price discrimination
What we should make, normatively, of price discrimination?
We might begin by observing that price discrimination is
not simply widely practiced, but widely accepted. It is hard
to detect any public outcry over bulk discounts, versioning,
student discounts, negotiations over car prices, and many
other instances of price discrimination. Of course the fact
that something is the case does not prove that it ought to be.
But considerations in support of these practices are not hard
to find, and can easily be extended to online personalized
pricing. The first argument appeals to a general freedom in
pricing. The second appeals to the effects of price discrimination on social welfare.
In market economies, sellers of goods typically have considerable freedom when it comes to pricing. This freedom
has two familiar moral foundations. The first is property
rights. What it means to own something is to have a bundle
of rights with respect to that thing. One of them is the right
to transfer it to someone else, or not, if (e.g.) what the seller
regards as sufficient payment is not received (Boatright,
2010). The second foundation is the value of the price system. As Hayek (1945) famously argued, prices serve a signaling function, telling us how much of a good is desired
relative to supply. Producers respond accordingly, making
more of what people want and less of what they don’t, and
in doing so, allocate resources to their most productive uses.
But prices serve this function only if they are set through the
voluntary choices of buyers and sellers. In sum, one argument for permitting price discrimination—and hence online
personalized pricing—is that it is entailed by the general
freedom that sellers have to price their goods as they wish.3
A second argument for permitting price discrimination
sees it as a practice with a particular social value. According to a familiar result in economics, price discrimination
increases social welfare, assuming that it enables sellers
to increase output. There is a mathematical proof for this
(Schmalensee, 1981; Varian, 1985), but it can be illustrated
through a simple example. Consider pricing for medical
drugs. Pharmaceutical companies sell drugs for lower prices
in developing countries than in developed countries. If they
were forced to sell drugs at a single price in all countries,
then they would have to choose the higher price in order to
cover their costs. They would stop selling drugs to people

3
According to the “just price” tradition, associated with Aquinas,
sellers should offer their goods for sale at a single price, viz., the just
price. On the standard interpretation of this idea, this is a function
of how much the good costs to produce. But a more recent strain of
scholarship argues that, for Aquinas, the just price mostly is the market price, as determined by the forces of supply and demand. In this
case, there is no disagreement between the just price tradition and
modern thinking about prices (see and cf. Koehn & Wilbratte, 2012).
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at lower prices in developing countries, and these people
would go without. The same goes for senior and student
discounts on museums, movies, and public transportation.
Price discrimination, including personalized pricing, helps
to eliminate deadweight losses, or the welfare gains that are
unrealized when possible transactions do not occur (Elegido,
2011). Indeed, it may increase the welfare of those for whom
welfare increases matter most, viz., those who are worse-off
(Parfit, 2002).4
My goal in this section is not to prove that online personalized pricing is permissible. While sellers in market
economies have considerable freedom to price goods as
they wish, most recognize limits on pricing, e.g., restrictions on price gouging (Snyder, 2009; cf. Zwolinski, 2008).
And while many forms of price discrimination are accepted,
some are not, e.g., price discrimination based on race or sex.
Rather, my point is that online personalized pricing is not
some nefarious scheme that is obviously wrong, but a version of a practice we are familiar with and accept, and for
which good reasons can be given. If we are to believe online
personalized pricing is wrong, an argument is needed.
Our contextualization of online personalized pricing also
suggests, though does not prove, that the most promising
arguments against this practice will have their source in the
ways in which it differs from other forms of price discrimination. Most forms of price discrimination elicit a shrug;
online personalized pricing elicits outrage. So if online price
personalization is wrong, it will likely be wrong because of
a feature that it has that other forms of price discrimination
do not have.
Below I present an argument against online price personalization which appeals to fairness in competition. This
argument does not assume that other forms of price discrimination are permissible. Indeed, it is compatible with the
4

It might wondered whether price discrimination has another positive social effect, viz., reducing inequality. Due to the diminishing
marginal utility of wealth, it might be said, the rich are willing to pay
more for any given good than the poor. When the rich pay more than
the poor, rich consumers’ wealth is reduced by a larger amount than
poor consumers’ wealth. As a result, the wealth gap between rich and
poor shrinks. This argument is questionable. First, while rich people
may generally have higher reservation prices than poor people, this
will not always be the case. In a notable case of price discrimination,
Staples charged less for office supplies to richer consumers, because it
faced stiffer competition in that area (Valentino-Devries et al., 2012).
Second, in addition to considering the wealth gap among consumers,
we also need to consider the wealth gap between consumers and producers. When a producer personalizes prices, he attempts to capture
all of the social surplus generated in a transaction with a consumer.
So price discrimination results in a transfer of wealth from consumers
to producers. Assuming that producers are wealthier than consumers,
this represents a transfer of wealth from the (relatively) poor to the
(relatively) rich, exacerbating inequality. The lesson to be drawn here
is that the distributional effects of price discrimination are difficult to
discern and will vary from case to case (cf. Elegido, 2011).
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claim that they are impermissible. But it identifies a distinctive wrong in online personalized pricing as it is currently
practiced.5

A problem of exploitation?
Before beginning, let me describe and put aside a different—
but perhaps intuitively attractive—way of thinking about
the issue. It might be claimed that personalized pricing is
exploitative (Turow et al., 2005). In a typical transaction, a
social surplus is created. When an online retailer personalizes prices, it tries to capture all of this surplus. It might be
said that, in doing so, the retailer exploits the consumer.
While there are many accounts of exploitation, the standard gloss on the concept is that to exploit someone is to
take unfair advantage of them (Zwolinski & Wertheimer,
2016). Consider a paradigm case. A and B are walking in the
woods. B is bitten by a poisonous snake. The venom will kill
B unless he takes an anti-venom quickly. As it happens, A is
carrying several vials of anti-venom. While it retails for $10,
A offers to sell B a vial for $1000. B does not have time to
find another source of anti-venom before he succumbs. No
one else is around and the nearest store is miles away. So B
pays A $1000. A is advantaged from his transaction with B
because A benefits from it. This benefit is unfair because A
gets much more than he should. Put another way, A benefits
excessively from his transaction with B (Valdman, 2009).
To say that A takes advantage of B implies a kind of extraction. It is not simply that A gets too much money from B. It
is that B has little choice but to accede to A’s demands. A’s
taking advantage is sometimes understood in terms of B’s
vulnerability. The fact that B is vulnerable—he was bitten
by a snake and is about to die—is what allows A to benefit
excessively.
Is online price personalization like this? The only plausible answer is ‘no’. The reason is that consumers who are
subject to price personalization online are typically not vulnerable in the way that B, the snakebite victim, is. Unlike B,
they have decent alternative options. Evidence of personalized pricing has been found at retailers such as Staples,
Amazon, Home Depot, Orbitz, and Expedia (Hannak et al.,
2014; Valentino-Devries et al., 2012). There are robust markets in the goods sold by these retailers. If a person doesn’t

5
Online price personalization may also raise concerns about privacy
(Kokolakis, 2017; Krishnamurthy et al., 2007). I do not consider such
concerns here, because it would take us too far afield. Moreover, the
threats to privacy involved in online price personalization are similar
to those involved in other familiar practices, such as online behavioral
advertising. The objection I raise to online price personalization does
not apply to online behavioral advertising—it is distinctive in this
sense also.
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get their office supplies from Staples, they can get them from
Office Max or Target. If a person doesn’t get their DVDs
from Amazon, they can get them from Best Buy or WalMart. And so on. Because ordinary consumers are not vulnerable to retailers, retailers are unable to extract excessive
benefits from them.
We can understand the difference between exploitation
and online price personalization in terms of a difference in
relative reservation prices. In a case of exploitation, the victim has an extremely high reservation price, because of his
vulnerability. But in a case of online personalized pricing,
the consumer’s reservation price isn’t unusually high; it’s
just that the retailer tries to sell the good to him as close to
that price as possible.
To be sure, there may be cases that involve both personalized pricing and exploitation. Imagine that you and I both
want a certain drug. I want it because of its pleasing effects.
You want it because without it, you will die. Your reservation price for the drug is much higher than mine. Beyond a
certain price, I will simply turn to another drug with pleasing effects. Suppose there is only one supplier of this drug,
and it costs the firm just $10 per dose to produce. Because
it wants to maximize profits, the firm charges you $1000
while it charges me $15. There is personalized pricing in
this case, because the amounts we are charged depend on
our reservation prices. There is exploitation too, but only
in your case. The seller uses your vulnerability to extract a
very high price for the drug from you. It follows from our
discussion that online price personalization and exploitation
are conceptually distinct. Moreover, most cases of the former
are not cases of the latter. So if online price personalization
is wrong, it is not because it is exploitative. I now explain
what is wrong with it.

Fairness in competition
Imagine you are playing a game of tennis with your usual
opponent, Pat. The game is not particularly high stakes, but
you are both trying to win. You would be disappointed if
you lost, and pleased if you won. You and Pat are normally
evenly matched, but today Pat is beating you handily. She
doesn’t win all the points, but she is winning a lot more
than normal. She seems to be able to predict exactly where
you are going to hit the ball. She is almost always in the
right spot, ready to deliver a powerful return. The reason
Pat is able to do this, it turns out, is that she is wearing a
special pair of glasses. The glasses contain a small computer
with information about every point you have played in all of
your recent matches against her. Pat has been wearing these
glasses for the past several months to collect data about how
you play, and in fact she has purchased information about
your play from a few of your other regular opponents, who
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have been wearing similar glasses. Pat has now flipped a
switch to activate an algorithm in the glasses that predicts
where you are going to hit the ball, taking into account factors such as where you are on the court, how fast the ball is
coming toward you, how late in the game it is, how hot it is,
and so on. The glasses are not perfect, and sometimes they
give Pat incorrect information. But they tell her the correct
information much of the time.
You see that Pat is wearing glasses, but you don’t know
what they do. This technology is new, and only some people
know about it. You assume that Pat’s glasses are correcting
her impaired vision, or protecting her eyes from errant shots.
What Pat is doing, I claim, is wrong. She is not playing
fair. By wearing the glasses, she gains an advantage over you
that you don’t know about, and haven’t consented to. You
thought you were playing against Pat, but you are playing
against Pat and her glasses, and they are winning.
My claim does not rely on the assumption that glasses
technology is against the official rules of tennis. We can add
to our example that this technology is sufficiently new that,
not only is it unknown to many tennis players, the appropriateness of its use in competition has not been contemplated
by the game’s rule-making authorities. My claim relies on
a moral intuition that what Pat does is unfair. It is a mistake
to think, in any case, that the permissibility of moves in
a competition is entirely dependent on what the rules say
(D’Agostino, 1981; Simon, 2000). Rather, what moves are
permitted by the rules should to some extent be responsive
to intuitions about what moves are fair. Even if we thought
Pat’s use of the glasses were permitted by the competition’s
rules—perhaps because the rules did not explicitly forbid
their use—her behavior would still be unfair.
It is worth observing that the problem with Pat’s behavior
is not simply that her glasses enable her to collect a lot of
information about how you play tennis. The problem is what
she does with this information, viz., use it to increase her
odds of winning the match.
It is important to my analysis that you don’t know that
Pat’s glasses give her an advantage over you, and that your
ignorance is reasonable. Assume that declining to play tennis
with Pat would not be excessively costly for you. (You could
play someone else, or not play at all.) Under these conditions, if you knew, or should have known, what Pat’s glasses
did for her, then your playing her could be understood to
be an act of consent to her behavior. She would still have
an advantage over you due to the glasses, but because you
consented to her wearing them, it no longer seems wrong
that she does. In the case at hand, however, the terms of your
and Pat’s engagement are not consented to. You think that
you and Pat are playing by a certain set of rules, but Pat is
playing by a different set of rules. Your rules countenance a
certain set of known strategies for winning, but Pat’s rules
include a new strategy.
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We can bring the sense unfairness at issue into sharper
focus by imagining that there is a different game—call it
tennis*—which is exactly like tennis except that participants
are allowed to wear glasses that predict where their opponents are going to hit the ball. Perhaps in this game people
try to win simply by overpowering their opponents. You are
playing according to the rules of tennis, but Pat is playing
according to the rules of tennis*.
What we have concluded about Pat and her glasses
applies to online retailers who personalize prices. Like
Pat, these retailers make use of a new and largely unknown
technology. In Pat’s case, it is the glasses. In the case of
online personalized pricing, it is a set of data-gathering and
data-processing technologies. Pat uses her glasses to predict
where you are going to hit the ball, so she can get ready to
deliver a powerful return. Online retailers who personalize
prices use their technology to predict your reservation price,
so they can offer you their goods at that price. Pat’s goal is to
win the match, which results in her enjoying the sweet taste
of victory. The retailer’s goal is to capture more of the social
surplus generated by transactions, which results in earning
higher revenues.
In the case of online personalized pricing, as in the tennis
case, it is important that you don’t know that your opponent is helping herself to an advantageous technology, and
that your ignorance is reasonable. You know that in some
contexts retailers attempt to tailor prices to individual shoppers—e.g., when you are shopping in person for a car, or
jewelry, or a mattress—but you reasonably believe you are
not in such a context. If you know what the retailer is doing,
and can avoid transacting with her at low cost, then your
transacting with her can be understood as an act of consent
to her behavior. But since you don’t know, you don’t consent.
In this case also, you think that you and your opponent are
playing by one set of rules, but your opponent is playing by
a different set of rules.
The argument from fair competition identifies a distinctive wrong in online personalized pricing. That is, it identifies a wrong which is found in online personalized pricing
but not in other forms of price discrimination, including
in-person personalized pricing. Most forms of price discrimination are transparent. Discounts for seniors, students,
and other groups are typically well-publicized. The norms
regarding in-person personalized pricing are widely known.
When you walk into a car dealership (or a jewelry store, a
furniture store, etc.), everyone knows that the competition
is “on.” The salesperson will try to sell you the car for as
much as you are willing to pay, and you will try to buy it for
as little as the salesperson will sell it for. Knowing that this
is what the salesperson is trying to do, you can take steps
to protect yourself, in an effort to keep more of the social
surplus for yourself. The salesperson can in turn try to take
steps to protect himself from you. One of you may be a more
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skilled negotiator, and may come out on top. But at least it
will have been a fair fight, with no hidden advantages on
either side.6

Does the analogy hold?
My argument against online personalized pricing is based on
an analogy between a tennis match and a business transaction. The objections I consider challenge the aptness of this
analogy. The first thing that might be said is that a business
transaction is not like a game. So the conclusions we draw
about Pat’s behavior do not apply to the behavior of online
retailers.
There is a lively literature about whether business can
be understood as a game. Some believe this comparison is
fitting (Ladd, 1970). They note that the morality of business
is not like the morality of ordinary life, and must be assessed
by different standards (Heath, 2014). Others resist it, arguing
that business and games are crucially different. Unlike business, games have a definite beginning and end, a clear set of
rules, and fairly small stakes (Koehn, 1997).
We need not enter into this debate. While my argument
relies on an analogy between a tennis match and a business
transaction, it does not rely on the claim that business in
general should be understood as a game, or that commercial
transactions specifically should be understood as games.
What is essential to my analysis is the idea of competition.
Competition occurs not only in games, but in other contexts
too, such as when applicants compete for jobs or when children compete for parents’ attention. Both a tennis match and
a negotiation over a social surplus are competitions. In both
cases individuals are pitted against each other—tennis players for points, and buyers and sellers for the social surplus.
Also in both cases, the competition is zero sum: the more
one person gets, the less the other gets. So in this sense, the
analogy between tennis matches and business transactions
holds.
This objection might be pressed a different way. It might
be claimed that the resemblance among competitions is

6
It might be thought that the problem with online personalized pricing is that the fight is not fair. The algorithm used to determine shoppers’ reservation prices in online personalized pricing, it might be
said, is a lot more accurate than the “algorithm” used to determine
their reservation prices in in-person personalized pricing. In online
personalized pricing, there is a sophisticated mathematical formula that takes into account many variables. In in-person personalized pricing, it is the salesperson’s intuition, based on a few observable characteristics. In response, this oversells the technology used in
online personalized pricing. It cannot read people’s minds; it is not
that accurate. Indeed, an experienced salesperson may be able discern
facts about shoppers that a computer cannot. The problem, I have
argued, is that the salesperson has an unknown advantage.
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weaker than the resemblance among games. We might be
able to say that what is true of a certain game G1 must be
true of another game G2, since both are games. But we cannot say that what is true of a certain competition C1 must be
true of another competition C2. Competitions are too diverse
a set of activities, according to this objection.
In response, I agree that competitions come in many
forms. Tennis competitions are different from competitions
over social surpluses. These competitions, in turn, are different than competitions for jobs, spots at selective universities, parents’ attention, lovers’ affection, and so on. But
games are similarly diverse. Tennis, football, golf, shuffleboard, monopoly, and poker are all games, but have vastly
different sets of rules. More importantly, I do not rest my
argument on the mere fact that tennis matches and business
transactions are both competitive activities. I have dug into
their details to show that they are alike in the key respects.
It is on this basis that I claim that online personalized pricing is similar to, and just as wrongful as, Pat’s behavior in
the tennis match.
There is a final way of questioning the aptness of this
analogy. It might be claimed that, not only are business
transactions not games, they are not even competitions. In
a business transaction, the seller offers a good for sale at a
certain price, and the shopper pays that price, or not, as she
chooses. When the transaction is concluded, it may turn out
that the seller has captured most of the social surplus, or that
the buyer has captured most of it. But at no point, according
to this objection, do the seller and buyer compete for the
social surplus. If they do not compete for it, the objection
goes on, then they aren’t bound to compete fairly for it. In
support of this objection, it might be observed that, while
competition is a standard and indeed desirable feature of
business, this is competition among sellers, to transact with
buyers. It is not competition between sellers and buyers.
This version of the objection also fails. It is true that there
is competition among retailers to sell goods to consumers.
But there is also competition between buyers and sellers. I
offer as evidence for this the phenomenology of bargaining.
Reflect on the experience of buying a car—or a house, a
mattress, a furniture set, or a trinket in a flea market. The
seller is trying to get you to pay more, so that she can capture
most of the social surplus. You, the buyer, are trying to get
the salesperson to sell it for less, so that you can capture
most of the social surplus. You cannot both capture most of
it. The salesperson gets more when you get less, and viceversa. You are both aware of these facts. Assuming a reasonable degree of self-interest, you will compete.
It might be replied that, while some retailers negotiate
prices, most retailers—including online retailers who personalize prices—do not. In most contexts, there is no backand-forth. There is simply the offering of a good at a certain
price by the seller, and the acceptance of that price, or not,
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by the buyer. So it might be claimed that while some retailers and shoppers compete over the social surplus, retailers
and shoppers in online contexts do not.
This claim should be resisted. When sellers personalize
prices, they are clearly trying to maximize their share of
the social surplus. That is the whole point of attempting to
discern shoppers’ reservation prices, viz., to sell them goods
at or at least near those prices. In doing so, retailers reveal
themselves to be in competition with shoppers. It is true that
there is no back-and-forth, but most shoppers do not know
that they are competing with retailers, and none have an
opportunity to make a counter-offer. More importantly, competition does not require negotiation. People compete all the
time for goods—jobs, parents’ attention, romantic partners,
and more—without negotiating the terms of exchange. In
fact, I suggest, all sellers—even those who do not personalize prices—can be understood as trying to maximize their
share of the social surplus in transactions. In the usual case,
they fix prices with the goal of maximizing their share of
the social surplus across all transactions considered as a set,
on the understanding that different shoppers have different
reservation prices. Given advances in technology, online
sellers can now tailor their prices to individual shoppers,
trying to maximize their share of the social surplus in each
individual transaction.

Other fairness‑based arguments
I have argued that online price personalization involves a
kind of unfairness, viz., unfairness in competition. In this
section I examine two other fairness-based arguments
against online personalized pricing, and explain why they
fall short.
In an early discussion, Marcoux (2006) considers and
rejects a fairness-based argument against online personalized pricing. According to this argument, online personalized pricing is unfair because it violates an equal treatment
norm, a norm which is claimed to require that sellers treat
buyers equally by charging them all the same price.
In reply, Marcoux points out that different people have
different reservation prices for goods. This means that they
derive different amounts of welfare, understood in terms of
consumer surplus, from purchasing goods, assuming they
are sold at a single price. If my reservation price for a stapler
is $5 and yours is $10, and the stapler is sold to both of us for
$4, then my consumer surplus is $1 while yours is $6. I gain
less from the transaction than you do. If equal treatment is
understood in terms of equal production of welfare, it would
be better if we were charged prices that reflect the differences in our reservation prices, e.g., if I were charged $4
and you were charged $9. For then we would both gain the
same consumer surplus of $1. Instead of supporting unitary
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pricing, then, an equal treatment norm in fact supports price
discrimination.
Marcoux is correct that this argument doesn’t work
against online personalizing pricing. It is notable, however,
that he does not identify anyone who endorses it. He identifies people—e.g., Krugman (2000)—who claim that online
personalized pricing is unfair, and he identifies a norm—a
version of the equal treatment norm—that someone might
try to use to justify this claim. But he does not identify anyone who actually endorses this version of the norm, or who
uses it to draw this conclusion. This is unsurprising. The
norm is implausible, and would condemn all forms of price
discrimination, not just online personalized pricing. Indeed,
this norm would condemn almost all forms of unitary pricing, except in the unusual case where consumers have identical reservation prices.
The argument given in this paper offers a way to justify
the claim that online personalized pricing is unfair without
appeal to an implausible norm. The crucial issue, I have
argued, is not whether consumers are equally benefitted by
their transactions with a retailer, but whether consumers are
on “equal footing” with retailers in the competition for the
surplus created by their transactions. What matters is not the
result—i.e., how much surplus each party ends up with—
but the competition itself—whether consumers and retailers
compete on fair terms.
In a more recent discussion, Steinberg (2019) endorses a
different fairness-based argument against online personalized pricing. He says that the problem with this practice is
that it prevents consumers from “profit[ing]” or “substantially benefit[ing]” from market exchanges, by which he
means capturing any of the social surplus generated by them
(2019, p. 113). One of the benefits of having a market, Steinberg says, is that it “provides individuals with the possibility
of improving rather than merely maintaining their welfare”
(2019, p. 112). When retailers capture all of the surplus created by a transaction, he continues, this doesn’t happen.
Steinberg’s claim that, when retailers personalize prices—
and in doing so, capture all of the social surplus—consumers
merely “maintain” their welfare seems false. Unless he is
forced to transact, if a consumer engages in a transaction,
then presumably he does so because he believes it makes
him better off, i.e., increases his welfare. This suggests that
consumers who are targets of online price personalization
still benefit from their transactions.
The deeper issue is that, intuitively, there is nothing unfair
per se with the retailer’s capturing all of the social surplus
from a transaction. Suppose that a retailer who does not personalize prices has a reservation price for a stapler of $3.
It lists it for sale at $4. As it happens, $4 is my reservation
price for the stapler. When I purchase the stapler for $4, the
retailer captures all of the social surplus. But it doesn’t seem
that there is anything wrong with this. It just so happens
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that I purchase an item for as much as I’m willing to pay for
it. Occurrences like these are common. The same goes if
the consumer, and not the retailer, captures all of the social
surplus. A retailer might place the stapler on sale for $3 in
order to clear space on its shelves. When I pay $4, I capture
all of the surplus—$1—in the transaction. It is hard to see
anything wrong with this result.
It might be claimed that the problem is that, in the case of
online price personalization, the retailer is trying to capture
all of the surplus. The retailer is greedy, gobbling up all of
the surplus, and intentionally leaving nothing for the consumer. But there does not seem to be anything wrong with
this either. In an in-person negotiation of the price of a car or
mattress, retailers and shoppers may each try to capture all
of the social surplus from the transaction. The shopper will
try to purchase the (e.g.) car for as close to his reservation
price as possible, while the salesperson will try to sell it to
him for as close to her reservation price as possible. This is
common and unremarkable.
Like Marcoux, Steinberg understands the unfairness of
online personalized pricing in terms of a result. The retailer
captures, or seeks to capture, all of the surplus generated
by a transaction, leaving none for the consumer. I have suggested that it is not wrong for the retailer (or the consumer)
to try to capture all of the surplus. What matters is not the
result but the process. In the competition for the surplus
generated by a transaction, retailers and consumers must be
on equal footing. But they are not. In online personalized
pricing, retailers are playing by one set of rules and shoppers are playing by another. I have offered an intuitive way
to account for the unfairness of this practice that appeals
not to the results it generates, but to the process that leads
to those results.

J. Moriarty

may benefit those for whom benefits matter most, assuming
that it results in sales of goods to people who couldn’t otherwise afford them. Could these considerations give us reason
to think that online personalized pricing should in the end be
permitted, in the hidden way that it is currently practiced?
Space considerations prevent a detailed exploration of
this issue, but I suggest the answer is ‘no’. The solution to
the problem of online personalized pricing is to make it
more like other forms of price discrimination. The problem
with online personalized pricing is that it occurs without
shoppers’ knowledge or consent. By contrast, other forms
of price discrimination, including second- and third-degree
price discrimination, and in-person personalized pricing,
occur in the open. It is plain for all to see that (e.g.) seniors
pay less than non-senior adults for many things and that
buying in bulk enables shoppers to get discounts on a peritem basis. Everyone knows that the prices displayed at car
dealerships (etc.), are negotiable, and the final price will be
in part a function of how much each party is willing to pay.
This suggests that online personalized pricing would not be
problematic if retailers disclosed that they were using it—or
alternatively, once this practice becomes common knowledge. Then shoppers would enter online retailers’ websites,
as they now do car dealerships, knowing what is at stake. If
online retailers are unwilling to disclose that they are personalizing prices, then the only way for them to steer clear
of moral wrongdoing is to stop doing so.
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